Is America’s system of homeownership just a mirage?
That’s the question Wall Street Journal economics editor David Wessel asks. The graph below compares the the peak homeownership rate, the current rate, and the percent of homeowners with positive equity for 10 of the largest U.S. metro regions. Less than half of homeowners have positive equity in their homes in eight of 10 of these metros: In Las Vegas, the figure is less than 20 percent.
The new state unemployment stats for May are out from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Michigan no longer leads the nation in unemployment – that distinction now goes to Nevada. Calculated Risk provides this chart of state unemployment rates.
Market forces are already causing a significant reset in America’s housing system – and a lot quicker than most people imagine.
Earlier this week, I argued that America’s penchant for homeownership distorted the economy, and that it makes good economic sense to tilt the balance of homeownership back from its high point of 70 percent to roughly 55 or 60 percent – about the level found in the most innovative, affluent, and highly skilled regions. The Urban Land Institute projections (PDF) already predict the homeownership level will fall back to 62-64 percent as a result of the downturn, tighter credit conditions, and demographic shifts.
Check out Richard Florida’s Big Think interview in its entirety in the video below, or visit Big Think to view the interview in segments which cover the economic crisis, home ownership, employment, New York and Detroit, and more.
Here’s the intro from my interview with Newsweek.com’s Nancy Cook.
As the economy recovers and Americans get back to work, the wage gap between white- and blue-collar work is expected to grow. According to new data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 60 million people—46 percent of the American workforce—in 2009 worked in the service sector as cashiers, office clerks, cooks, nurses, retail salespeople, or customer-service representatives.
But rather than consign nearly half of the nation’s workers to relatively low-paying jobs, why not use the recession as an opportunity to make over service work into something fulfilling and analytical, hopefully with higher wages? So asks Richard Florida, professor, social scientist, and author of the bestselling book The Rise of the Creative Class. Following the release of his latest tome,The Great Reset: How New Ways of Living and Working Drive Post-Crash Prosperity, NEWSWEEK’S Nancy Cook asked Florida about his vision for “upgrading” the service economy.
Read the full interview here.
How do economic crises affect inequality? In the past, inequality increased prior to economic crises, only to moderate during and after crisis periods. In the present crisis, many expected inequality to decline. Others, however, note that with job loss in the millions and unemployment above 10 percent, while investment bankers continue to rake in big bonuses inequality is on the rise.
A new study by researchers at the Minneapolis Fed and New York University tracks inequality in the U.S. since 1970 (via Mark Thoma). I find that while income inequality has increased during the crisis, consumption inequality has declined.
Recent evidence shows how the distribution of resources changes in recessions in complex ways.
- The bottom of the earnings distribution falls off substantially relative to the median, causing earnings inequality to increase in recessions.
- This increase is substantially mitigated by government and private transfers. This mitigating effect, together with the fact that households can use borrowing and lending to smooth income declines, causes the consumption distribution to typically move very little during recessions.
- The current recession appears somewhat unusual. So far, consumption inequality has declined sharply, perhaps because the consumption-rich have been disproportionately hurt by declining asset prices.
I was talking to a 60-year-old, retired entrepreneur at a party the other night. Successful guy, very sharp. I asked him what he thinks is next for Florida and he said he did not have much hope for Florida, mostly due to lack of visionary leadership. Then he said something that really struck me. He suggested that Florida is on a course to reset to its old state of being “cheap, sunny, and dumb.”
That really struck me because while we are all talking about the great reset that is going on, I had not thought to ask the question, “What does Florida reset to?” And he may very well be right. At the state level, we are relaxing the rules for developers to encourage even more sprawl to try to kick-start our construction industry again. We are actually lowering impact fees in places. We are lowering protections on the environment. This seems like a reset towards “cheap, sunny, and dumb.” There are powerful forces and attitudes that could very well push Florida back into this reset mode. And that is pretty scary.
While we all generally agree that this reset is needed and welcomed in some cases, we should be careful that we don’t reset back to a point so far back that we actually lose too much of our hard won progress. We all have to ask ourselves and our leadership what the plan and vision is for this reset. Each community is facing this and we act as if the reset is just something that will happen. That is not the case, yet I hear far too little debate as to how we actively shape the reset.
American attitudes toward immigration are hardening, according to a new Gallup poll. Half of all Americans say immigration should be “decreased” – up 11 points from 39 percent last year.
Anti-immigration sentiment is growing across all major political groupings. Some 61 percent of Republicans say they would like to see immigration decreased, up from 46 percent in 2008, compared to 46 percent of Democrats, up from 39 percent; and 44 percent of Independents, up from 37 percent.
Southerners show the greatest anti-immigration sentiment with 54 percent saying they would like to see immigration decreased, followed by easterners (51 percent), midwesterners (48 percent), and westerners (44 percent).
The poll also saw a shift in American attitudes toward whether “immigration is a good or a bad thing for the country” with more than a third (36 percent) saying it is a bad thing.
Gallup notes that this marks “a return to the attitudes that prevailed in the first few years after 9/11.”
Immigration in America has gone in great cycles over the past century or two. While immigration has typically fallen during economic crises, the U.S. has prospered from its relative openness to global talent. America saw an influx of leading scientists, entrepreneurs, artists, and musicians during the Great Depression which helped bolster its position at the frontiers of science, technology, entrepreneurship, and the arts during the long post-war boom.
Economic crises are transformative periods when talent flows can be reset and countries and regions rise and decline. The future belongs to those countries and regions that can attract the best and brightest across the entire world.
Growing anti-immigrant sentiment, should it continue, is bad news for American technology, entrepreneurship, and the economy in general. Let’s hope it turns around.
The impacts of the economic crisis continue to be felt unevenly across the country. I’ve previously looked at the factors associated with higher rates of regional unemployment. But which places have seen the biggest jumps in unemployment since the crisis hit?
To get at this, my colleague Charlotta Mellander conducted a straightforward statistical exercise called a “residual analysis.” It’s a simple way to track how a location performs relative to the performance of all other locations. Basically, the analysis examines to what extent the initial unemployment rate in May 2008 seems to have had an impact on the change in unemployment over the last year. Technically speaking, Mellander ran a regression analysis predicting change in unemployment over this last year (May 2008 to May 2009) as a function of the initial level of unemployment at the beginning of the period (May 2008). She then compared the predicted values to the actual values.
The first graph shows the pattern for U.S. states.
The hardest hit states are ones that were doing badly even before the crisis hit. The fitted line is steep; the correlation between the two is 0.59 and significant; and the R2, 0.345. States below the line experienced a smaller than predicted increase in unemployment levels, while those above the line saw a larger than predicted increase.
Michigan has the highest unemployment rate, but Oregon (+3.0) has taken the biggest relative hit. Alabama (+1.8), Indiana (+1.6), South Carolina (+1.6), and Wisconsin (+1.4) have also taken bigger than expected hits. North Dakota has the lowest rate of unemployment but Alaska (-2.8), Mississippi (-2.1), Arkansas (-1.2), Connecticut (-1.2), Iowa (-1.1), and Nebraska (-1.2) have done better than expected.
The second graph repeats the analysis for U.S. metropolitan regions. It excludes two extreme outliers in California – Yuma and El Centro – which started the period with 20 percent plus rates of unemployment.
The hardest hit metros are also those that were doing badly before the crisis. The fitted line is again steep; the correlation coefficient is high, 0.59; and the R2, 0.351.
The crisis has hit hardest at smaller Rustbelt metros, especially those in Indiana: Elkhart-Goshen, IN; (+7.3); Kokomo, IN (+7.2); Decatur, GA (+3.2); Sheboygan, WI (+2.7); Fort Wayne, IN (+2.3); and Youngstown, OH (+2.2).
While Detroit has faced staggering unemployment, the difference between its actual and predicted unemployment is +1.6. Among large metros, Portland (+3.1), Charlotte (+2.2), and, San Jose (+1.9) experienced even bigger than expected increases in unemployment. Las Vegas (1.5), Boise (1.29), and Orlando (+1.29) have also been hard hit. San Francisco (+.93), Miami (+.49), L.A., Chicago (+.31), Atlanta, and San Diego (+.21) also performed worse than their May 2008 unemployment levels predicted.
Several Oregon metros took worse than expected hits: Bend-(+4.6), Eugene-Springfield (+3.8), Portland (+3.0), Salem (+2.5), Medford (+2.4), Corvallis(+1.9). Metros that border Oregon like Spokane, Washington (+0.8) and Boise, Idaho (+1.3) also have high differentials.
Three Texas cities – Dallas (-1.0), Houston (-0.9), and Austin (-1.0) – performed considerably better than expected. Minneapolis-St. Paul (-0.4) did too. Cities along the Bos-Wash mega-region – Boston (-0.4), D.C. (-0.3), New York (-0.1), and even Philadelphia (-0.3) – also did better than predicted. Surprisingly, Phoenix also outperformed expectations (-.2), albeit modestly.
College towns number among the best performers, doing much better than predicted: Champaign-Urbana, Illinois, home to University of Illinois (-2.2); Iowa City, University of Iowa (-1.81); Manhattan Kansas, Kansas State University (-1.82); College Station, Texas, Texas A&M (-1.74); New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University (-1.54); State College, Pennsylvania, Penn State University (-1.47); Boulder, Colorado, University of Colorado (-.93); Austin, Texas, University of Texas (-1.0); Ann Arbor, Michigan, University of Michigan (-.94); and Ithaca, New York, Cornell University (-.97), among others.
In a widely read cover story published earlier this month, Business Week’s chief economist Michael Mandel asks, “To what degree has American innovation been ‘interrupted’?” Mandel argues that the economic crisis is partly the result of America’s failure to generate high-impact commercial innovations.
What if, outside of a few high-profile areas, the past decade has seen far too few commercial innovations that can transform lives and move the economy forward? What if, rather than being an era of rapid innovation, this has been an era of innovation interrupted?
The crux of his argument is that many, if not most, of the big breakthrough innovations that were supposed to occur over the past decade or so have failed to materialize. His article provides a raft of compelling examples of once-heralded innovations – in areas from biotech to micro-machines – that have simply not panned out. This failure to commercialize and diffuse these new breakthrough innovations – America’s inability to set in motion the great gales of “creative destruction” identified long ago by Joseph Schumpeter as key to capitalist growth – he argues, is a key contributor to both the financial bubble and the economic crisis.
But since there is compelling evidence that the figures are overstated by the credit bubble and statistical problems, we can construct a plausible narrative for the financial bust that gives a starring role to innovation-or rather, to the lack of it. It goes something like this: In the late 1990s most economists and CEOs agreed that the U.S. was embarking on a once-in-a-century innovation wave-not just in info tech but also in biotech and many other technologies. Forecasters upped their long-run growth estimates for the U.S. economy. Consumers borrowed against their home equity, assuming their future incomes would rise. And foreign investors lent America money by buying up U.S. securities, assuming the country would come up with enough new products to pay off the accumulated trade deficit.
Mandel lists four areas in which America’s recent performance has been lackluster: stock market performance in the pharmaceutical, biotech, and life-science sectors; declining real wages for highly educated workers; a mounting trade deficit in high-tech sectors (which grew from $30 billion U.S. surplus in 1998, turning into a $53 billion deficit by 2008); and little improvement in the death rate (which he sees as a measure of the failure of breakthrough medical technologies to materialize) as evidence for the failure of American innovation.
It’s no secret that I’m a big fan of Mandel and I find his general thesis about lagging U.S. productivity and job growth over the past decade or so to be both intriguing and plausible. And since so much of my own work focused on the relationship between innovation and American competitiveness was flagging, I find myself particularly drawn to his most recent “innovation-interrupted” thesis.
My first book, The Breakthrough Illusion, written with Martin Kenney in 1990, argued that the U.S. system of venture capital-backed breakthrough innovation was skewed to encourage short-term super-returns from new breakthrough innovations, and was structurally ill-suited to capturing the longer-term wealth derived from developing these innovations into successful products and industries. That work drew upon the intriguing thesis of innovation theorist Henry Ergas, who argued that the U.S. had developed a shifting system of innovation geared to near-constant development of new products through new firms, as opposed to a deepening system (think of German cars) which continuously adds technology to upgrade existing industries. According to Ergas, the key to long-run prosperity lies in synthesizing both strategies – cultivating an economy which could deploy new technologies in new sectors while at the same time deploying them to upgrade and revolutionize old ones.
I opened my 2002 book, Rise of the Creative Class, with a time-traveler experiment. Someone traveling from 1900 to 1950 would be blown away by the varied technical marvels that surrounded them from televisions to airplanes. But while someone who time-traveled from 1950 to the 2000 would see a few new technologies, like the personal computer and the cell phone, he or she would likely be much more amazed by sweeping social changes. And in my 2004 book, Flight of the Creative Class, I argued that America’s innovative edge in the late 20th century was inextricably tied to its ability to attract foreign scientists, technologists, and engineers. The combination of mounting U.S. immigration restrictions and growing efforts by foreign countries to retain their own best and brightest (and attract others from around the world), I suggested, was an under-appreciated threat to U.S. competitiveness and prosperity.
In fact, I found Mandel’s essay so compelling that I decided to take a look at the actual data. Mandel rightly says that we currently lack a comprehensive “innovation index” that tracks commercial innovation: “There’s no government-constructed “innovation index” that would allow us to conclude unambiguously that we’ve been experiencing an innovation shortfall. Still, plenty of clues point in that direction.”
True enough. But research into the economics of innovation has discovered at least one reasonable measure of innovation – patents. There are problems and biases with using patents as a measure of innovation, as economists who specialize in the subject have pointed out. Patents measure certain areas of technology more than others. In some areas of commercially important R&D, patents are rarely used. Other areas, including less commercially relevant ones, are awash in patents for minutiae. And patents are not synonymous with commercially relevant innovations. That said, patents do provide a consistent, broad-gauge indicator of the level and rate of innovation – one that can be tracked over long periods of time and be broken out by nation, city, and region, and by U.S. resident versus non-resident or foreign inventors.
With my Prosperity Institute team – Charlotte Mellander, Scott Pennington, Dieter Kogler, and Patrick Adler – I’ve taken a look at the trends in U.S.-patented innovations. In a series of posts this week, I will report our findings. Tomorrow we’ll look at the trends in U.S. patents over time. Wednesday we’ll explore patenting by U.S. resident versus non-resident (foreign) inventors. Thursday we’ll examine the geographic distribution of innovation – tracking the rise of some innovative regions and the fall of others. And Friday we’ll discuss the longer-run historical relationship between innovation and economic crises.
