Check out this CNN video of Detroit’s terrific Ice House project. The two men managing the “collaboration with Mother Nature” are dousing the state-donated house with water to make a statement about the frozen housing crisis. It’s their hope that this installation art piece will reveal a solution and show that there are plenty of uses for abandoned homes, whether they’re used for recycled materials or turned into new homes.
Check out the Ice House website.
The differences between the U.S. and Canadian housing markets astound me on a day-to-day basis. In my neighborhood in Toronto, housing prices are up and homes sell in a few days, some with multiple bids. In Detroit, where we visited for Thanksgiving, you can’t sell – or in some cases, even give – houses away. Visiting Miami for Art Basel, the numbers of houses and condos on the market are staggering – stunning, brand new towers remain virtually empty.
The Cleveland Fed reports on the key differences between the U.S. and Canadian markets (pointer via Marginal Revolution).
Despite their many points of similarity, housing markets in the United States and Canada have fared quite differently since the onset of the financial crisis. Unlike the U.S., Canada has not experienced a dramatic increase in mortgage defaults, nor has any Canadian bank required a government bailout. As a result, observers such as The Economist have pointed to Canada as “a country that got things right.” …
The Canada and U.S. housing market comparison suggests that relaxed lending standards likely played a critical role in the U.S. housing bust. Monetary policy was very similar in both countries from 2000 to 2008, but housing prices rose much faster in the U.S. than in Canada. This suggests that some other factor both drove the more rapid appreciation in U.S. prices and set the stage for the housing bust. A likely candidate is cross-country differences in the structure and regulation of subprime lending markets …
But while subprime lending also increased in Canada, the subprime market remains much smaller than in the U.S. The most cited estimate is that subprime lenders had a market share of roughly 5 percent in 2006—compared to 22 percent in the U.S. (Mortgage Architects, 2007). Moreover, the Canadian subprime market never expanded significantly into newer products, such as interest-only or negative-amortization mortgages, whose popularity grew rapidly in the U.S. from 2003 to 2006. Instead, the Canadian subprime market mainly offered products popularized in the U.S. during the 1990s, such as longer amortization periods for loans (from 25 to 40 years), and mainly targeted near-prime borrowers.
Securitization has also been less common in Canada than in the United States, with roughly 25 percent of Canadian mortgages securitized in 2007 versus nearly 60 percent in the U.S. The Canadian securitization market has grown rapidly over the past decade, rising from roughly 5 percent of mortgages in 1998 to over 25 percent in 2008 …
Perhaps the simplest story is that Canada was “lucky” to be a late adopter of U.S. innovations rather than an innovator in mortgage finance. While the subprime share of the Canadian market was small, it was growing rapidly prior to the onset of the U.S. subprime crisis. In response to the U.S. crisis, some subprime lenders exited the Canadian market due to difficulties in securing funding. In addition, the Canadian government moved in July 2008 to tighten the standards for mortgage insurance required for high LTV loans originated by federally regulated financial institutions. This further limited the ability of Canadian banks to directly offer subprime-type products to borrowers.
There are also several institutional details that played a role. The Canadian market lacks a counterpart to Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, both of which played a significant role in the growth of securitization in the U.S. In addition, bank capital regulation in Canada treats off-balance sheet vehicles more strictly than the U.S., and the stricter treatment reduces the incentive for Canadian banks to move mortgage loans to off-balance sheet vehicles. Finally, as noted above, the fact that the government-mandated mortgage insurance for high LTV loans issued by Canadian banks effectively made it impossible for banks to offer certain subprime products. This likely slowed the growth of the subprime market in Canada, as nonbank intermediaries had to organically grow origination networks.
So the news last week was that the housing market was seemingly getting back on track. Take a gander at this, via Calculated Risk. Based on data put together by Matt Padilla, it tracks foreclosures in Orange County. Now Orange County has certainly been one of the harder hit markets, but still there is no turn around in the trend. The trajectory is straight up. And until foreclosures start to slow down, the housing market can’t really bounce back, now can it?
James Kwak weighs in here.
Yesterday, we looked at the relationship between housing prices and income. Today, we turn to the relationship between housing prices and wages. Wages are a useful way to gauge regional housing prices because they only count money that is earned by doing work. Income, on the other hand, counts any and all earnings from investments, interest, dividends transfers, and other sources.
The graph below plots housing prices in 2009 against wage levels for 2008 (the most recent data available).
There is a clear, positive, linear, and significant relationship between wages and housing values – the correlation is 0.71 and the R2 0.51. Metros above the fitted line had higher housing prices than wages relative to national levels, while those beneath the line had lower than expected housing prices.
Near the top we see many of the same regions as in yesterday’s analysis. Honolulu is once again the greatest outlier, with housing prices exceeding wage levels with a differential of $384,290. Metros in California once again play a prominent role at the top of the list, including San Diego ($87,365), Los Angeles ($63,340), and San Francisco ($60,148). New York also registers a substantial differential of $76,896; Miami ($46,128) also has a considerable differential.
On the other hand, there are metros where housing prices were less than their incomes would predict based on the national trend. In Decatur, IL, for example, housing prices were $131,344 less than what its wage level could support based on the national trend. In Michigan, both Saginaw ($123,140) and Lansing ($119,334) had differentials over $100,000, as did two Ohio cities, Akron ($105,447) and Cleveland ($105,386). Atlanta ($86,079), Washington, D.C. ($65,446), and Dallas ($51,896) all had differentials of greater than $50,000, while Houston ($48,874), Chicago ($48,794), and Boston ($42,834) all had differentials of greater than $40,000. The difference was more modest in Philadelphia ($20,520). We’ve again omitted Detroit because it failed to report housing price data for 2009.
The past couple of days, we’ve looked at the relationship between past and current housing prices. We saw that there are some regions where housing prices have fallen more than what might be expected based on national trends, while prices have declined considerably less than expected in others.
Today, we shift gears looking at the relationship between housing price and incomes. The graph below compares median housing prices in 2009 to income per capita levels in 2007 (the most recent figures available).
Housing prices and incomes are closely associated with one another: The correlation coefficient is 0.68 and the R2, 0.46. Metros above the fitted line have housing prices that are higher than their incomes relative to the national trend, while those below the line have housing values that are less than what their incomes would predict relative to the national trend.
In Honolulu, for example, the differential was a whopping $371,777. Almost half of the top 10 regions are in California. In San Jose the differential is $120,134, San Diego ($106,625), Los Angeles ($103,278), and San Francisco ($59,633). The differential was also in the Pacific Northwest – Portland ($74,490) and Seattle ($60,848), as well as Salt Lake City ($77,526) and New York ($93,900).
On the other hand, there are metros where housing prices were significantly less than their incomes would predict based on the national trend. In Bridgeport, CT, for example, housing prices were $151,460 less than what its income level could support based on the national trend. In Cape Coral, FL, the figure was $110,460. This was also true in Rustbelt regions like Akron ($106,692) and Cleveland ($105,130) which had differentials greater than $100,000. There were also considerable differentials in two Texas cities, Houston ($93,586) and Dallas ($58,602). In addition to this, Atlanta ($50,166), Chicago ($30,337), Philadelphia ($18,699), and Washington, D.C. ($17,280) all had housing prices that are less than their incomes would predict based on the national trend. We’ve omitted Detroit because it failed to report housing value data for 2009.
Yesterday, I compared 2009 housing prices to their 2006 baseline. Today, I turn to the change in housing prices. The graph below plots the percentage units change in housing prices between 2006 and 2009 against the 2006 baseline price.
There is a significant relationship between the two. The slope is steep, with a correlation of -0.42 and the R2 of 0.19. Metros above the line have seen drops which are less than would be expected based on national trends, while those below the line have seen drops in excess of the national trend. The numbers in parentheses are the percentage difference between the actual and predicted values.
Under-performers: These are regions where the decline in housing prices has been greater than predicted based on the national trend. The biggest losers are metros in the Sunbelt and Rustbelt. In Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL, for example, housing prices have declined 47.3 percent more than expected based on the national trend. For Akron, OH, the figure is 44.9 percent; Lansing, MI (-39.6 percent); Cleveland, OH (-35.4 percent); Grand Rapids, MI (-33.9 percent); Phoenix, AZ (-31.7 percent); Sarasota, FL (-29.7 percent); Riverside, CA (-29.3 percent); Toledo, OH (-29.3 percent); Palm Bay-Melbourne, FL (-29.1 percent); Sacramento, CA (-28.8 percent); Canton, OH (-28.3 percent); and Las Vegas, NV (-28.2 percent). Miami (-18.56 percent), Atlanta (-18.05 percent), Chicago (-11.72 percent), Los Angeles (-10.07 percent), and Washington, D.C. also performed worse than expected.
Over-performers: There were again a series of regions that performed better than the national trend. These are places where housing prices have held up better than expected based on the national pattern. In Honolulu, HI, for example, housing prices remain 31.1 percent above what could be expected based on the national pattern. Cumberland, MD, a suburb of Washington, D.C., has held up 30.4 percent better than expected. In Salt Lake City, UT, the figure is 29.8 percent; Bismarck, ND (26.2 percent); Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX (25.9percent); Farmington, NM (25.7 percent); Binghamton, NY (24.2 percent); Columbia, MO (22.4 percent); Raleigh, NC (21.3 percent); and Austin, TX (19.7 percent). New York (11.3 percent), Philadelphia (7.4 percent), Houston (6.37 percent), and Dallas (+4.2 percent) also performed better than expected.
Housing prices continue to fall nationally but the economic impacts of the crisis are being felt unevenly across the country. Housing values are off roughly a third from their peak in mid-2006, according to the Case-Shiller Home Price Index. Phoenix and Las Vegas have taken the biggest hits, suffering declines of more than 50 percent in the past year. Miami, San Diego, L.A., and Tampa have also been hard hit. Detroit has seen housing prices sink to mid-90s levels. Housing prices have declined less significantly in greater D.C., Chicago, Seattle, Atlanta, New York, Portland, Boston, Denver, Dallas, and Charlotte. But the Case-Shiller data only covers 20 large metro regions.
This week, I take a look at how housing prices have fared across the full set of more than 300 American metropolitan areas. The posts are based on statistical analysis by my colleague Charlotta Mellander. Today and tomorrow, I’ll look at how housing prices have fared since their 2006 peak. Later in the week, I’ll look at the relationship between housing prices and incomes and wages.
The graph below compares housing prices in 2009 to their 2006 baseline price. It’s based on “residual analysis,” comparing the change in housing prices between 2006 and 2009.
Clearly, the two are related – the correlation is 0.903 and the R2 is 0.815. But the slope of the fitted line suggests that, on average, housing values in these regions have dropped by approximately 15 percent. Metros above the line have lost less value than their 2006 worth would predict, while those below the line have lost more.
Under-performers: These are regions where housing values have slipped even more than predicted. Among large metros, the under-performers include: Los Angeles (where values are off $79,789 more than expected based on the national trend), San Francisco (-$79,029), Las Vegas ($-72,421), Phoenix (-$69,897), and Miami (-$53,021). Cape Coral, FL saw the biggest relative decline (- $111,797), followed by Riverside, CA (-$103,683), Sacramento, CA (-$91,640), and Sarasota, FL (-$82,353). Akron, OH (-$59,635) and Lansing, MI (-$57,574) also saw significant declines. Housing values were down slightly more than would have been expected in Atlanta (-$27,413), Chicago (-$16,580), and greater D.C. (-$14,411). 2009 data for Detroit were not available.
Over-performers: The analysis turned up a number of over-performing regions. By that I mean regions with housing values performed better than expected relative to the national trend. Over-performers include: Honolulu (where housing values remain $160,414 more than expected), Boulder ($72,172), Salt Lake City ($68,935), Seattle ($61,997), New York ($58,407), Raleigh, NC ($57,552), Portland, OR ($42,173), Baltimore ($39,896), Austin ($38,181), Philadelphia ($29,011), Boston ($13,644), Houston ($8,693), and Dallas ($5,661).
Stay tuned for more tomorrow.
A new study finds that housing prices have had a big effect on recent mobility. Here’s a snippet from Real Time Economics.
Housing affordability has played a greater role in prompting residents to leave one state for another over the past decade, according to a study released by the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
This is a change from the past, when jobs were the primary economic driving factor behind state-to-state migration. The study helps explain why migration has fallen off so sharply in this recession — with the drastic fall in housing prices, many people are staying put not for work but because they are tied to a home they either cannot sell or refuse to sell at today’s prices.
The FRB study focuses on New England, which for years has seen a net outflow of residents to other states. The author, Boston Fed economist Alicia Sasser, shows that job growth (or lack thereof) and housing prices played equal roles in New England’s out-migration between 1997 and 2006. Between 2001 and 2006 about 100,000 additional people left Massachusetts either for a job or to seek lower housing prices, according to Ms. Sasser’s research. Roughly 60% of those people left for housing affordability …
Mr. Sasser’s study may give a glimmer of hope to states that have lost people, at least high-cost states like Massachusetts that have lost people to places with lower-priced housing (cities like Buffalo that have lost jobs will likely continue to lose residents.) When the economy eventually picks up, lower housing prices may bring the balance between jobs and home prices back into equilibrium, prompting more New Englanders to stay where they are or even move back.
One consequence of the economic crisis is that the rate of home ownership has been slipping, as the chart below shows (via Calculated Risk).
A growing number of economists and urbanists question whether the United States has put too much emphasis on homeownership and over-invested in housing. Ever since the Great Depression, America has generously subsidized homeownership through the tax code and by other means. Housing does take up a significant share of U.S. investment comparatively speaking; and, in some regions, real estate, housing, and construction made up a huge share of the local economy, as high as 25 to 30 percent at the height of the bubble, bigger than education, health-care, government, or manufacturing. I’ve argued elsewhere that the two American dreams – of homeownership and of unfettered economic mobility – may be in conflict, as homeownership, especially in downturns like today, impedes mobility and makes it harder for individuals to move to work and the labor market on the whole to adjust.
The benefits versus costs of homeownership is an important debate. On the pro-side, Joel Kotkin makes the case for homeownership in his recent Forbes column. Stephen Slivinski provides a thorough review (via Tyler Cowen) of the downsides of what he calls America’s homeownership bias.
Simply put, Americans may have overinvested in housing. This has been a worry of economists for a while. It’s a concern based on what they see when they compare the rates of return – profit per dollar invested – for a variety of capital types … “When you observe that the measurable rates of return are different across the sectors,” said the Dallas Fed study author, Lori Taylor of Texas A&M University, “you either have to conclude that there are substantial unmeasured returns across the sectors or you have to conclude that society would be better off with a reallocation of resources.” These unmeasured benefits would have to be very large – at least $3,600 per homeowner in America – for the investment imbalance to be explained …
Robert Shiller, an economist at Yale University and an expert on national housing markets, has estimated that “from 1890 through 1990, the return on residential real estate was just about zero after inflation.” Throw in the costs of maintenance of the property and it’s easy to see how renting could certainly be cheaper than owning, even if you include the tax advantages. Yet the opportunity cost of those home investments – the foregone investment opportunities elsewhere – go largely unseen …
Being tied down to a house tends to make people less likely to leave an area in which employment prospects are deteriorating …A seminal study by British economist Andrew Oswald of the University of Warwick traced the link between unemployment and homeownership. Oswald looked at the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Sweden between 1960 and 1996 and discovered that, on average, a 10 percentage point increase in homeownership tended to correlate with a 2 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate.
Recent studies of European data discover that you don’t see these sorts of correlations in areas with higher concentrations of renters. Renters are simply more able and willing to move away when their community hits the economic skids. In addition, workers who aren’t likely to move from a specific location might create frictions in the markets for labor skills. It’s a cost to the economy when people live in an area in which their skills are no longer valued. But there is a potential personal cost too: The overall welfare of that worker may suffer. Homeownership also tends to contribute to adverse political incentives. Incumbent homeowners have an interest in keeping their property values high and have been shown statistically to have a bias in favor of land-use regulations. These restrictions limit the number of houses that can be built in any geographic area and, consequently, keep housing inventory low and property values artificially inflated.
It appears that the crisis is causing a shift from homeownership to rental, as the graph below (also from Calculated Risk) shows. This trend may end up being a good thing for certain homeowners and for the flexibility of the U.S. economy as a whole.
One thing we know about crises is they frequently bring about significant changes in the system of housing tenure. The Great Depression and New Deal innovations in housing finance and housing policy, plus the post-war boom and infrastructure building, brought a massive shift toward single family homeownership. My hunch is it’s time for new hybrid forms of housing tenure which mix the benefits of ownership with the flexibility of renting.
Writing in The Atlantic, I argued that the economic crisis was reshaping America’s economic geography, with big city centers and mega-region hubs like New York City, talent-rich regions like greater D.C., and college towns weathering the storm relatively well, while Rustbelt cities and shallow-rooted Sunbelt economies being much harder hit.
Take a look at the graph below from the newly released SP/Case-Shiller Home Price Index for April.
Phoenix and Las Vegas have taken the biggest hits: Housing prices there have declined more than 50 percent in the past year. Miami is next, then Detroit where housing prices have sunk to mid-90s levels. San Francisco is the only significant talent region to be pummeled. Part of this is to be expected given the tremendous run-up in housing prices there, but still prices remain higher than 2000 levels. San Diego, L.A., and Tampa have all seen declines in excess of 40 percent.
Housing prices have declined less significantly in greater D.C., Chicago (hub of the great Chi-Pitts mega-region and a magnet for regional talent), Seattle (a high-tech, high human capital center), Atlanta (a talent hub for the southeast), New York, Portland, Boston, Denver – (talent hub for the Rockies), Dallas (a mega-region hub), and Charlotte (which along with Atlanta hubs the great Char-lanta mega-region). Cleveland breaks the pattern, but like Detroit its absolute housing values have fallen. Prices in greater D.C., along with Denver, Dallas, and Cleveland, were actually up in April.
The Index also tracks prices in terms of their 2000 baseline. Nationally, it’s at 140, meaning housing prices remain 40 percent higher than in 2000, more or less in line with 2003 prices. Looked at it this way, the geographic pattern could not be more striking.
Rustbelt cities have seen, by far, the biggest declines relative to 2000 prices. Detroit and Cleveland are the only two cities where housing values have slipped below 2000 values – Detroit at 69 percent and Cleveland at 98 percent.
Prices have just about fallen back to 2000 levels in Sunbelt cities like Phoenix (105), Atlanta (105), Las Vegas (112), Dallas (115) and Charlotte (118). 
Miami (145) and Tampa (140) break the pattern; their prices remain significantly above 2000 levels. My guess is that prices will continue to fall and sharply in these two markets in the coming months.
But prices in prices in Boston (146), L.A. (149), greater D.C. (167), and New York (170) remain significantly above – 50 to 70 percent above – 2000 levels. While these prices may dip some, my hunch is these markets will not be devastated and will remain substantially above 2000 levels.
The SP/Case-Shiller Index suggests that housing prices are still falling and have another 30 or more to go before they hit bottom. One thing you can be sure of, it will continue to be felt unequally across regions.
